⚠ Abuse-Tooling Advisory Classified 2026-07-06 · codelake triage
Confirmed abuse tooling. codelake independently classified this at 2026-07-06 (codelake triage) — monotenant is NOT catalogued in OSV or GHSA — and it should not be: those databases track supply-chain attacks on whoever installs a package, and monotenant does not attack its installer (no install-time credential theft, no postinstall auto-execution). It is intentional abuse tooling that its operator runs to attack third parties. codelake classified it independently from the live npm feed and reported it to npm for acceptable-use / abuse takedown — the correct channel for this class..
Advisory · CLR-2026-2995

A bulk-mail & credential-cracking toolkit shipped as an npm package

The npm package monotenant@1.0.53 markets itself as "the only light-speed mailing server on planet earth." Its actual purpose is email abuse at scale: it verifies lists of stolen AWS SES, SMTP and Exchange (EWS) credentials, discovers targets via Shodan, and mass-mails through the validated accounts behind rotating proxies and fake identities — reporting results to an operator-controlled Telegram bot. It is not a supply-chain attack on whoever installs it (no install-time theft, no postinstall); it is a weapon the operator runs against third parties. We classify it as Abuse tooling and reported it to npm for takedown.

HighAbuse toolingBulk-mailer / SES crackerNot a supply-chain attackReported to npm
Summary

The npm package monotenant (version 1.0.53, plus 1.0.42 / 1.0.43 / 1.0.50) presents itself as a mailing product — its README reads "The only light-speed mailing server existing on planet earth." In reality it is an obfuscated abuse toolkit: every one of its 288 JavaScript files is run through a commercial obfuscator, and beneath that packing sits a bulk-mail and credential-cracking engine.

De-obfuscated, the modules describe their own function: an AWS SES credential verifier/mailer (it takes lists of AWS keys, checks their SES send capability at concurrency, and sends through the working ones), Shodan-based target discovery, and an SMTP / Microsoft Exchange (EWS) mailer (via nodemailer, imapflow, node-ews). It rotates SOCKS/HTTP proxies, fabricates sender identities with @faker-js/faker, packs results into encrypted archives, and reports to an operator-configured Telegram bot.

Crucially, monotenant does not harvest the credentials of the developer who installs it: there is no os.homedir() read of ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, .npmrc or .env, and no postinstall hook — nothing runs on npm install. It executes only when the operator deliberately runs its CLI. That distinction is why this is an abuse-tooling advisory, not a malware one.

Why this is classified as Abuse, not Malware

Malware advisories (and the OSV / ossf-malicious-packages database) cover packages that attack whoever installs them — a poisoned postinstall, a hidden credential stealer, a download-and-execute dropper. monotenant does none of that to its installer.

monotenant is a tool for abusing third parties. The AWS/SMTP/EWS credentials it works on are operator-supplied target lists, and the Telegram endpoint is the operator's own results channel — not the victim developer's machine. Publishing such tooling to a public registry violates npm's Acceptable-Use policy (which prohibits using the service to send spam and to distribute tooling that facilitates attacks on other systems), but it is a registry-abuse / takedown matter, not a supply-chain infection.

We flag the distinction explicitly so defenders triage correctly: installing monotenant does not compromise your workstation or CI — but the package should not be on the registry, and its presence is a signal worth blocking.

Indicators & characteristics
PKGmonotenant (npm) — versions 1.0.53 / 1.0.50 / 1.0.43 / 1.0.42; description "M!T"; UNLICENSED
SHAeac1cb2f291aec7cdbc0b97e590691dd92a2539eb2e41cb53eb5247a22924e08 · monotenant-1.0.53.tgz
OBF288/288 JS files hex-obfuscated (whole-package javascript-obfuscator build); cryptic module names (passgo, dnsxt, rhok, whid, aws, lkpt)
FUNCAWS SES verify/mail (verifyAwsSesRow, parseAwsTargets, awsSesConcurrency), Shodan target discovery (awsShodanQuery), SMTP/EWS mailer (nodemailer, imapflow, node-ews)
INFRASOCKS/HTTP proxy rotation (socks, socks-proxy-agent), fake identities (@faker-js/faker), results to operator Telegram bot (config.telegram.token/chatId)
DECEPTDead homepage https://mntmc.rip + dead repo github.com/oonlyjs/mono; empty author; README claims Apache-2.0/SFC while package.json says UNLICENSED
Response & guidance
#ActionPriority
01 No workstation/CI remediation is required from installing it. monotenant does not run on install and does not read local credentials — merely having installed it does not compromise the host. (If you deliberately ran it, that is a separate abuse-of-others concern.) Info
02 Block / deny-list the package in your registry proxy or allow-list policy — it has no legitimate use in a build. Recommended
03 Defenders of mail infrastructure: the pattern (SES-credential verification at concurrency, Shodan-discovered SMTP/EWS targets, proxy-rotated sending) is a useful signature — watch for SES GetSendQuota/send bursts from rotating IPs and unfamiliar EWS logins. Recommended
04 Reported to npm for acceptable-use / abuse takedown. This class is out of scope for OSV / ossf-malicious-packages (no supply-chain attack on the installer); the registry ToS channel is the correct route. Done

Classified independently by codelake Research · AI-assisted triage + deterministic structural analysis (whole-package de-obfuscation; verified the absence of any installer-credential-theft path). Reported to npm for acceptable-use takedown.

This is an abuse-tooling advisory, not a supply-chain-malware one: monotenant does not attack the developer who installs it. No working payload or reproduction is published — the capability is described. The original artifact is preserved in the codelake archive and available to verified security researchers on request.